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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
**** 
 
 JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving 
Defendant Rowan pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(i) as 
an appeal from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree 
felony. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving 
Defendant George pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(b) as a 
case certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals. The Court consolidated the cases on 
November 20, 2015 after a stipulated motion by the parties.1 
                                                
1 The trial court prepared a record for each defendant on appeal. Many of the 
pleadings were duplicated and are contained in each record, however, there are 
some documents only found in Rowan’s record. To the extent that some of the 
relevant documents are not contained in one record or another the defendants do 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH,  
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
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 ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
 1. Whether the trial court erred when it found the warrant affidavit did not 
support probable cause.  This Court will “review a district court’s assessment of a 
magistrate’s probable cause determination for correctness and ask whether the 
district court erred in concluding that the magistrate did not have a substantial 
basis for his or her probable cause determination.” State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, 
¶12, 267 P.3d 210. It will review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion 
to suppress based on an illegal search as a mixed question of law and fact. State 
v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. “We review the factual findings 
underlying a grant of a motion to suppress evidence under a ‘clearly erroneous’ 
standard, and review the trial court’s conclusions of law based thereon for 
correctness.” State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App 1993) (citing State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)).2 
                                                                                                                                                       
not claim the State has failed to preserve or provide an adequate record. The 
cases have been consolidated on appeal and defendants will treat the records as 
though they are one combined record. In order to be consistent with the State’s 
brief, citations to the electronic record from Michael Rowan’s case will be 
designated by the letter “R”, and citations to the electronic record from Rebecca 
George’s case will be designated by the letter “G”. 
2 Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard of review can be 
attributed to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of Fourth 
Amendment cases. See State v. Norris, 2001 UT ¶14, 48 P.3d 872 (the line of 
cases leads to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 
(1983)). Because this case is being decided under the Utah Constitution, and 
because this Court has not yet disclosed the Utah standard of review involved in a 
district court’s assessment of a magistrate’s probable cause determination in 
issuing a warrant, Defendants suggest using the simple standard of review this 
Court has applied in similar circumstances: the factual questions for clear error; 
 3 
The question of probable cause was preserved, to the extent it was 
preserved, by the “State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress”. R.041-
53. In its response, the State preserved four arguments: (1) the “CI” demonstrated 
sufficient credibility; (2) probable cause supported the search of “All Persons, All 
Residence”; (3) the officer corroborated the “CI” information; and (4) even with 
probable cause the Leon good-faith exception should apply. Any other probable 
cause arguments were not preserved by the State.3 
 2. Whether this Court should reverse its prior holdings that article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires exclusion of evidence obtained from 
illegal searches and seizures. The State’s suggestion, that the existence of a state 
exclusionary rule is merely a matter of constitutional interpretation reviewed for 
correctness, is only half right. State’s Brief at 3. In reality, this Court is not only 
interpreting the Utah Constitution, it is deciding whether its current precedent 
regarding the Utah Constitution should be abandoned. In this circumstance the 
Court reviews challenges to its former interpretations of the Utah Constitution in 
light of the doctrine of stare decisis, and it will not overrule its precedents lightly. 
State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33. Although courts of last resort are not bound to 
mechanically apply stare decisis, the “presumption against overruling” precedent 
is “weightier” in some cases. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33 (citing Eldridge v. 
Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶22, 345 P.3d 553).  
                                                                                                                                                       
and the existence of probable cause for correctness. An argument supporting this 
standard will be made below. 
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 The State preserved this issue in its Response to Address Good Faith 
Exception Under Utah Constitution, where it argued the trial court should 
“abandon the precedent regarding the exclusionary rule under article I, section 
14, of the Utah Constitution” because the precedent lacked “proper scrutiny”. 
R.102. The State preserved the arguments that the Utah exclusionary rule is not 
supported by the text of section 14, the history of the constitutional convention 
does not support exclusion, section 14 is not self-executing, and exclusion 
constitutes bad public policy. R.104-10. 
 3. Whether this Court should create an as-yet unrecognized good-faith 
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule. The trial court declined to do so and this 
Court reviews a request to create an exception to the Utah Constitution for 
correctness. 
 The request was preserved by the State in its Response to Address Good 
Faith Exception Under Utah Constitution where it argued the trial court should 
apply the interstitial model of constitutional analysis, thereby foregoing any 
analysis of whether any independent good-faith exception applies to Utah’s 
Constitution. R.112-28. The State also argued a good-faith exception should apply 
to Utah’s Constitution because the exclusionary rule, like the federal rule, “is a 
judicial remedy designed to deter future constitutional violations by law 
enforcement” and “not a constitutional requirement.” R.131. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.    
 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
 The State of Utah appeals from the final order of the district court 
dismissing the charges following the suppression of evidence that substantially 
impaired the State’s ability to proceed to trial. The trial court ruled that the police 
illegally obtained evidence during an unlawful search of the defendants’ home.  
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
 Michael Rowan (Rowan) was charged with (1) Distribution of or Arranging 
to Distribute a Controlled Substance (marijuana) in a Drug Free Zone; a second 
degree felony; (2) Possession of a Controlled Substance (marijuana) with Intent 
to Distribute with Prior Conviction in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (3) 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (psilocybin) with Prior Conviction in 
a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (4) Possession or Use of a Firearm by 
Restricted Person, a third degree felony, and (5) Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor. R.001-02. Both 
Rowan and Rebecca George (George) were charged with (5) Endangerment of a 
Child or Vulnerable Adult, a third degree felony. R.002, G.002. 
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of their 
home, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause under both 
the state and federal constitutions. R.027-37. The State opposed the motion. 
R.263-68; G.104. After argument, the trial court denied the motion, concluding 
that the warrant was not supported by probable cause, but refused to suppress 
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the evidence under the federal good faith exception articulated in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). R.226-32,269-81; G.84-78,105.  Defendants 
subsequently supplemented their argument and asked the trial court for a ruling 
on the question of the good faith exception under the Utah constitution. R070-
80. In response, the State argued that there is no basis for an exclusionary rule 
under the Utah Constitution and, even if there were, it should include a good-
faith exception analogous to the federal exception. R.088-146. The trial court 
heard additional argument and then granted the Defendants’ motion to suppress, 
declining to overrule the state exclusionary rule, and declining to recognize a 
good-faith exception. R.180-94, 282-90; G.51-37. 
On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against 
Defendants on the ground that the suppression of evidence substantially 
impaired the State’s cases. R.241, 247; G.92,98.  
 The State timely appealed both cases. R.251-52; G.101-100. After this Court 
elected to retain the Rowan case on its docket, the court of appeals certified the 
George case for transfer to this Court. R.306. 
 7 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS4 
1. On August 28, 2012, a district court judge authorized a search warrant for a 
residence located at [address deleted] in Provo, Utah. 
2. The warrant issued based on the supporting affidavit of Officer Steven O. Pratt 
of the Springville Police Department. 
3. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant on the same day it issued. 
4. The information supporting the warrant came primarily from a confidential 
informant. (“the Confidential Informant”). 
5. The Confidential Informant was cooperating with the police in exchange for 
leniency on pending charges. (Affidavit, ¶4). [Found in the record at R.062]. 
6. The Confidential Informant told police that a person named Mike was in 
possession of marijuana and would sell it to the Confidential Informant. 
(Transcript of June 17, 2014 Pretrial Conference, p.2, lines 11-13). [Found in 
the record at R.272]. 
7. The Confidential Informant stated that he had been in Mike’s home in the past, 
but did not say when. (Transcript, p.2, lines 13-15). [Found in the record at 
R.272]. 
                                                
4 Defendants take the first section of this Statement of Relevant Facts verbatim 
from the trial court’s “Findings of Fact” within its ruling on the motion to 
suppress, most of which refer to the transcript of a hearing at which the court 
made oral findings. R.227-30. Because the State has not alleged any errors in the 
trial court’s factual findings, and neither do Defendants, this is the most accurate 
statement of facts available. To the extent the State has taken away from or added 
to the trial court’s findings, without making a challenge thereto, this Court should 
ignore the State’s factual recitation. 
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8. The Confidential Informant stated that he had purchased drugs from Mike. 
(Transcript, p.2, lines 15-16). [Found in the record at R.272]. 
9. The Confidential Informant further stated that (1) Mike sells marijuana in 
bulk; (2) Mike’s product is vacuum-sealed; (3) Mike travels to California to 
obtain marijuana to sell in Utah; (4) Mike keeps his marijuana in a residence 
located at [address deleted] in Provo; (6) Mike is a martial arts master and is 
very familiar with the art of combat; (7) the Confidential Informant has heard 
Mike speak of firearms in the past, but did not say when; and (8) the 
Confidential Informant believed there may be a firearm in Mike’s residence, 
but offered no facts to substantiate this belief. (Transcript, p.2-3, 16-25; 1-3). 
[Found in the record at R.272-73]. 
10. The information provided by the Confidential Informant to police purported to 
be based in the Confidential Informant’s personal knowledge. (Transcript, p.3, 
lines 4-5). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
11. The police tried to identify Mike by checking records on the residence, vehicle 
registrations, and other police records, but were ultimately unsuccessful in 
corroborating any of the information that the Confidential Informant provided. 
(Transcript, p.3, lines 5-9). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
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12. The police did not attempt to corroborate independently any of the other 
information provided by the Confidential Informant.5 (Transcript, p.3, lines 9-
12). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
13. Instead, the police arranged for what was intended to be a “controlled” buy, 
although the controls were at best slipshod. (Transcript, p.3, lines 13-14). 
[Found in the record at R.273]. 
14. The police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and found no 
controlled substances. (Transcript, p.3, line 15). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
15. The Confidential Informant then made a call to a person the Confidential 
Informant identified as Mike. Police monitored the call. (Transcript, p.3, 15-
17). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
16. The Confidential Informant agreed to purchase a certain amount of marijuana 
for a certain amount of money from the person who was on the phone. 
(Transcript, p.3, lines 17-20). [Found in the record at R.273] 
17. The sale would take place at the [address deleted] address in Provo. 
(Transcript, p.3, lines 20-21). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
                                                
5 The following was attached as a footnote to the trial court’s finding number 12. 
“The failure of the police to corroborate any of the Informant’s information and 
failure to ‘control’ the buy in which the Informant participated stand in stark 
contrast to representations in the Affidavit. There, the affiant swears that ‘the 
[Informant] has provided creditable [sic] information and has not said anything 
that would prove false or misleading. The information the [Informant] has given 
has been investigated and proved credible.” (Affidavit, ¶4). The only measure 
police took to corroborate the Informant’s claims was to conduct a buy which 
they failed to control. Other investigation yielded no information. At best, these 
representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.” R.228. 
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18. Police issued buy money to the Confidential Informant. (Transcript, p.3, lines 
21-22). [Found in the record at R.273]. 
19. For reasons that remain puzzling, police then allowed the Confidential 
Informant—a known user of controlled substances whose cooperation with 
police was given in exchange for leniency on pending charges—to get back into 
his own vehicle and drive to the residence at [address deleted] in Provo. 
(Transcript, pp.3-4, lines 23-25, 1-2; Affidavit, ¶7). [Found in the record at 
R.273-74, R.062] 
20. Police did not search the vehicle for controlled substances before the 
Confidential Informant drove to the residence. (Transcript, p.4, lines 3-5). 
[Found in the record at R.274]. 
21. The Confidential Informant went into the house. A short time later, police 
observed the Confidential Informant exit the residence. (Transcript, p.4, lines 
5-6; Affidavit, ¶8). [Found in the record at R.274; R.062]. 
22. Again, the Confidential Informant was allowed to drive his own vehicle from 
the residence to a predetermined location where he met the police. (Affidavit, 
¶8). [Found in the record at R.062]. 
23. Police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and discovered a 
controlled substance. The buy money was not discovered on the Confidential 
Informant’s person. Transcript, p.4, lines 6-9; Affidavit, ¶8). [Found in the 
record at R.274; R.062]. 
 11 
24. Police did not search the Confidential Informant’s vehicle after the buy. 
(Transcript, p.4, lines 8-9). [Found in the record at R.274]. 
  In addition to the facts specifically noted in the trial court’s findings, the 
affidavit in support of the warrant also contained the following relevant 
information.  
  The affiant met the Confidential Informant within “the past 72 hours” of 
requesting the warrant. R.062. Although the Confidential Informant claimed “Mike 
keeps marijuana inside his residence”, the Confidential Informant admitted he did 
not know where it was kept. R.062.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the warrant was not supported 
by probable cause because the affidavit relied upon conclusory statements, 
unspecific information, and a ‘controlled’ buy which was anything but controlled. 
The police had no reason to believe the drugs found on the Confidential 
Informant did not come from his car which they neglected to search. Even under 
the substantial basis standard the trial court would have been correct in 
concluding that the magistrate’s  
 In the alternative, the trial court could have concluded the warrant was 
improper because the police omitted crucial information that mislead the 
magistrate on issues critical to the determination of the informant’s credibility. 
The officer’s alleged that the Confidential Informant was reliable based on his 
record of not providing false or misleading information, but the officer’s 
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neglected to admit that the informant had never provided them any information 
before, true or false. This omission mislead the magistrate into crediting the 
Confidential Informant as a solid source rather than the unproven criminal 
looking to gain favor in his own case. 
 2. This Court should not overrule the Utah cases that recognize the 
exclusionary rule in Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The existence of 
an exclusionary rule is supported by the text of the Constitution, by the intent of 
the framers, and by the historical context at the time of ratification. 
 3. This Court should not recognize a good-faith exception to Utah’s 
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially crafted remedy 
to deter police misconduct, it is the natural manifestation of the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects”. Exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is the essence of the right. Exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence puts the people back into the state which existed prior to the 
violation, it reestablishes a person’s security guaranteed by the language of the 
constitution. A good-faith exception undermines these purposes. A good-faith 
exception undermines the warrant issuing process by diminishes the incentive 
the police have to actually establish probable cause and insulating the reviewing 
judges from any scrutiny. A good faith exception obliterates the textual 
requirement that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause”. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE WARRANT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. Relevant Standard of Review 
 The standard of review may be of interest to this Court as it considers how 
to interpret the Utah Constitution and how cases like this one, where a warrant 
was issued and then later invalidated after a motion to suppress. The State’s Brief 
cites Norris, 2001 UT 104 for the proposition that reviewing courts “afford[] 
great deference to the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.” State’s 
Brief at 3. The State goes on to cite the United States Supreme Court in support of 
its claim that this Court will not examine de novo whether or not probable cause 
existed, but only whether the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that 
probable cause existed. State’s Brief at 3 (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 
U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.C.t 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984)). 
“The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a civil 
right.” Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 58, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941) (J. Wolfe 
concurring). So too would be the right to be protected from a search warrants 
issued without probable cause. The problem with the standard of review 
proposed by the State, and imposed by the federal case law, is that is destroys the 
probable cause standard, thereby diminishing individual civil rights. The plain 
language of the right is that warrants “shall not issue but upon probable cause.” 
The obvious meaning of that language is that we have the right not to have a 
 14 
magistrate issue a warrant to search or seize us or our property without probable 
cause. 
In reality, the standard of review applied under the federal constitution 
adds an asterisk to the Fourth Amendment, and in a small font in a footnote the 
federal constitution now says “Warrants may actually issue without probable cause so 
long as the magistrate has a substantial basis to conclude probable cause may exist, 
regardless of whether or not probable cause actually does exist.” How this standard 
can be said to protect one of our most inviolate and sacred rights is a mystery. 
Probable cause is probable cause. Halfway, or ¾, or 9/10 of the way to probable 
cause may be a substantial basis, but it is not probable cause. Any standard that 
fails to require probable cause should give pause to a court seeking to follow the 
text of the constitution. 
Instead of applying the substantial basis standard, as the federal courts 
have applied to the federal right, Defendants urge this Court, as it takes the 
opportunity to consider the section 14, to apply a standard of review that 
adequately accounts for the significance and simplicity of the right the 
government has allegedly violated. After all, if the same constitutional right is 
afforded a non-deferential correctness review when a search occurs without a 
warrant6 (i.e. Did probable cause exist when the police searched an automobile 
on the side of the road?), why should the existence of an invalid warrant 
                                                
6 See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶15, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004) (this Court 
abandoned “the standard which extended ‘some deference’ to the application of 
law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor of non-
deferential review.”). 
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undermine or diminish a person’s right to be free from government interference 
with a less demanding standard (i.e. Regardless of probable cause, did the 
magistrate have a substantial basis to find probable cause?)? The obvious answer, 
the answer that strictly interprets the the language of the constitution is that the 
existence of a warrant shouldn’t undermine or diminish the probable cause 
standard. Probable cause is probable cause, whether this Court is reviewing a 
district court’s finding of probable cause for an automobile search or a 
magistrate’s finding of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant, the right is 
the same and the review is the same, so too should be the standard of review. 
However, the State in its brief and the federal case law support the 
distinction between the standard in warrant and non-warrant cases. The State 
argues that this Court “may not invalidate the warrant simply because it might 
have reached a different result”. State’s Brief at 14. In other words, this Court may 
not invalidate a warrant even if the Court finds it was not supported by probable 
cause. This is distinct from this Court’s ability and practice to invalidate a search 
made without a warrant where it finds it was not supported by probable cause. 
Applying this rule, imagine the police are investigating the activity at two 
adjoining houses and collect the same amount of evidence in support of their 
intended search for each house, evidence which does not support probable cause, 
and the police obtain a warrant in one instance and decline to request a warrant 
in the other. The house without the warrant is entitled to the full protection of the 
probable cause standard, the search of this home would be illegal. But the house 
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with the warrant is denied the protection of the probable cause standard, and 
some unclear metric, something less than probable cause, justified the search. 
 According to the State, this distinction is appropriate because “the 
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined 
by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State’s Brief at 14 (quoting United 
States v. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684). In other 
words, because we like warrants, if it is a close case where we are not sure 
whether or not probable cause existed and there is a warrant, we are going to say 
probable cause existed. Apparently, tie goes to the warrant.  
It actually goes further than that. The federal courts, in an effort to 
encourage the police to request a warrant, have decided to reduce the amount of 
evidence needed to support a warrant if the officers are willing to go to the 
trouble of requesting it. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (“this Court, strongly 
supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated 
that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable 
where without one it would fall”) (loosely citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 270, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)).7 Put plainly, according to the State 
                                                
7 Defendants claim the citation in Vantresca to Jones is loose because page 270 of 
the Jones decision does not indicate the evidentiary requirement in warrant cases 
was lower than in non-warrant cases. What page 270 does indicate is that 
warrants should not require more evidence or “evidence of a more judicially 
competent or persuasive character” than would support probable cause without a 
warrant, and that in close cases “it is most important that resort be had to a 
warrant, so that the evidence in the possession of the police may be weighed by 
an independent judicial officer”. Jones, 270. This is very different than saying a 
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and at least some of the federal case law, a search does not really need to be based 
on probable cause if a judge was willing to sign a warrant. 
The standard of review distinction between probable cause and the 
somewhat lower standard in warrant cases is ruinous to the explicit 
constitutional requirement that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause.” 
This Court should take this opportunity to “support, obey and defend… the 
Constitution of this State” by implementing a Utah standard of review that 
requires warrants to be supported by probable cause, period. UTAH CONST., ART. 
IV, SEC. 10. Even if this Court feels compelled to start its analysis by examining 
federal precedent, any such “precedent is certainly not controlling if 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are inconsistent or confused.” State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1205-06 (Utah 1995)). Federal precedent which interprets the explicit 
probable cause requirement and concludes there is a distinction between 
probable cause to support a warrantless search and something less than probable 
cause to support a warrant is undoubtedly inconsistent and confused. This Court 
should feel no obligation follow these cases. 
Defendants contend that federal efforts to encourage officers to follow the 
constitutional demand for warrants have had the (perhaps) unintended 
consequence of diminishing and undermining the rights explicitly provided by 
                                                                                                                                                       
warrant probable cause requires less evidence than non-warrant probable cause, 
as Vantresca interprets it. 
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our constitution. Any attempt to follow that federal path is at odds with an oath 
to support, obey and defend Utah’s constitution. Both as judges and as members 
of the bar we have sworn fidelity to the protection of these rights. It is in light of 
that duty that appellate counsel urges to the Court to consider this case as a 
whole, and specifically the applicable standard of proof. 
B. Relevant Search and Seizure Law 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. Despite the simplicity of the language used 
in Utah’s constitution, there has been great confusion about what the right 
actually means, how it can be vindicated, and under what circumstances the 
government can infringe upon the right. 
The confusion about the breadth and depth of the federal counterpart found 
in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is multiplied many 
times over. See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman 
concurring) (describing the federal search and seizure law as a “labyrinth of rules 
built upon a series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and 
distinctions”). It is in this context, the confused and contradictory federal search 
and seizure case law, that the Defendants in this case come before this Court 
seeking a simple and straightforward application of Utah’s right, as a distinct and 
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independent source of protection from government interference in the lives of the 
people of Utah.  
Based upon the trial court’s ruling and the State’s appeal, the only question 
in this section is whether, according to Utah’s constitutional requirements, the 
magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude the warrant application 
established “probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” UTAH 
CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14.8 Or, if the Court accepts Defendants’ invitation and 
applies the constitutionally sound standard of review, the only question is 
whether the trial court erred in concluding the affidavit did not establish 
probable cause. Defendants assert this Court can answer both of these questions 
in the negative. 
“Since our Constitution requires a showing of probable cause to support a 
search warrant… we hold, in line with the overwhelming weight of authority in 
the federal and state courts” that an affidavit is not sufficient if it is made only on 
information and belief, and is not corroborated or supported by personal 
knowledge. Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 476 (Utah 1939). In Allen, a statute 
authorized the issuance of a warrant if the affiant “deposes that he has reason to 
                                                
8 The question of whether the affidavit particularly described “the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be seized” was not address in the court 
below and the record does not include any facts about whether the description in 
the affidavit is accurate. On its face, the affidavit uses language sufficiently 
particularized so as not to trigger any concern. Therefore, Defendants limit their 
support argument to the question of probable cause. 
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believe and does believe the articles are wrongfully held or used.” This Court 
concluded that probable cause was not “satisfied by an oath that one has reason 
to believe and does believe.” Allen, 97 Utah 471, 475. 
Probable cause in Utah is more than suspicion, and it is more than 
reasonable belief. Probable cause is defined as an “apparent state of facts that a 
discreet and prudent man would be led to the belief that the accused, at the time 
of the application for the warrant, was in possession of the property.” Allen, 97 
Utah 471, 477 (quoting Cornelius on Search and Seizure, § 83). Defendants assert 
that the use of the word “was” in that sentence is crucially important. The term is 
not “might be” or even “is likely”, the discreet and prudent person, based on the 
information he possesses, believes some set of facts “is” the case. The distinction 
between the level of evidence the statute in Allen required and probable cause is 
important in this case. Having reason to believe something means there are facts 
that one can point to has supporting that belief, thus it is not just a hunch but 
based on reason. Reason to believe is not probable cause. Probable cause must be 
based upon enough evidence that a discreet and prudent person, a person who 
understood that taking a position on the matter will have serious consequences to 
the constitutional rights of another person, would be led to believe that a certain 
set of facts actually exist. 
There are no hard and fast rules delineating what amount of evidence 
creates probable cause. Probable cause must be based upon articulated 
particularized facts and circumstances and mere conclusory statements will not 
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suffice. The foundation of the existence of facts must be shown, the affiant must 
disclose the source of the facts, the reason he knows a fact to be true. With those 
considerations in mind courts are instructed to consider the totality of the 
evidence and make a practical decision whether there is a fair probability that 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. See State v. Espinoza, 723 
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). 
C. Application 
1. Did the affidavit establish probable cause? 
 The information collected by the police came entirely from CI. And almost 
all of the information provided by CI was conclusory, and unsupported by 
reference to CI’s knowledge or experience. For example, the State points to the 
statement from CI that “Mike” travels to California to obtain marijuana to sell it 
in “vacuum sealed” bags. State’s Brief at 16, see R.202, 062. But none of these 
facts are supported in the affidavit by reference to how CI knew these facts. 
Perhaps there is a possible inference from CI’s statement that he “has been in 
Mike’s home in the past and has made drug purchases from him.” R.062. But that 
statement gives no time frame, nor does it make any reference to any facts that 
could lead the magistrate to suspect CI’s was actually based on observation or 
information was recent enough to support ongoing suspicion.  
 According to the affidavit, the CI did not say he saw drugs in vacuum 
sealed packages or give any facts to show how he knew that is how they were 
packaged, in fact the CI admitted to the police that he did not know where in the 
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house the drugs were kept, suggesting the CI had not seen drugs in the house. 
R.062. The affidavit did not include evidence that the drugs CI delivered to the 
police were vacuum sealed.  
 The affidavit did not include a claim that the CI observed Mike drive to 
California to purchase drugs, or any other facts from which anyone could 
conclude the CI had some personal knowledge about that. Nothing in the affidavit 
suggests the police had any information to show CI’s statements about his 
interactions with “Mike” were anything more than mere conclusory statements 
from CI.   
 As the affidavit made clear, and as the trial court found, despite their 
efforts to confirm CI’s statements by checking records, the officers were 
“ultimately unsuccessful in corroborating any information provided by the CI.” 
R.202 (emphasis added). The police did not know who “Mike” was, they did not 
know of his reputation or know of any prior drug involvements. And the police 
did not “attempt to corroborate any other innocent information provided by the 
informant.” R.202. The officers were satisfied to accept the CI’s word, which had 
not been and could not be verified or supported in any way.  
 This blind trust in CI’s unsupported statements continued as the officers 
had CI arrange to buy drugs. After the police searched his person CI made a 
supervised phone call with “Mike”, but that supervision does not describe 
whether or how they knew who, if anyone, CI was talking to. R.062. There is no 
mention of the number CI dialed, there is no mention making a recording. The 
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officers’ supervision of the communication with “Mike” apparently consisted of 
listening to CI as he spoke into a cell phone and discussed purchasing “a 
predetermined amount of marijuana… for a predetermined amount of money” to 
occur at “Mike’s” residence, the same residence the police had not been able to 
connect to any person or confirm that anyone named Mike lived there. R.062. 
 The police then sent CI back into his unsearched car and followed him as 
he drove to the house in Provo and then went into the house. There is nothing in 
the affidavit suggesting the officers could see what was happening in the house, 
or whether or not CI was even met at the door by anyone, it just says he “arrived 
at the residence… and went inside.” R.062. “A short time passed and the CI was 
seen leaving the residence.” R.062. Other than CI’s presence at the listed address, 
the affidavit is devoid of any fact that would support or corroborate any of what 
CI later says happened in the house. After CI exited the house he got back into his 
unsearched car and drove back to meet up with the police. At that point CI did 
not have the money on his person and did have drugs, which he said he bought 
from “Mike”. R.062. 
 The trial court considered three main factors in its totality of the 
circumstances review: CI’s reliability, the basis of his knowledge, and the degree 
to which CI’s assertions could be corroborated. R.204. In each instance the trial 
court found the facts presented were unpersuasive. The State, in its brief, now 
argues the opposite inference. State’s Brief at 16-17. However, the State’s 
arguments, about the reasons to believe CI, and his incentives to tell the truth, 
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are all dependent upon the validity of the controlled buy. For example, the State 
argues that CI was a known defendant so he was “exposed to possible criminal 
and civil prosecution if the report was false.” State’s Brief at 16 (quoting State v. 
Royball, 2010 UT 34, ¶16, 232 P.3d 1016). If anything CI had said could be 
verified then perhaps this argument makes sense, but as demonstrated by the 
lack of any personal knowledge, CI’s statements to the police were more like the 
recitation of rumor than a declaration of facts. CI never told the police he knew or 
had personal experience of any of these facts, so in what way could they be false? 
 The State also argues that CI “risked losing the benefit of leniency in his 
criminal case if his report proved to be false.” State’s Brief at 16. Again, there was 
no risk to CI because his facts were vague and unchallengeable and the police 
allowed him to tell a story and then failed to corroborate any part of it. 
 What is most flawed about the State’s position regarding CI’s reliability is 
its characterization of the information CI provided. Nothing about the affidavit 
reflects that the allegations CI reported were “based on his first-hand” 
knowledge. State’s Brief at 17. Instead, most of the allegations were merely bare 
assertions of fact without explanation of how CI would know it. The details about 
“Mike’s” operations were very likely not based on personal knowledge, like the 
California detail, or the drugs being stored in some unknown location. The 
affidavit reveals the police, and the magistrate, really had no reason to credit CI 
with any degree of reliability. As the trial court noted, these weaknesses were 
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compounded when the police were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
“corroborat[e] any information provided by the CI.” R.202. 
 Finally, the State suggests CI’s admission that “he himself ‘has made drug 
purchases’ from Mike at his home.” State’s Brief at 17. The State relies upon State 
v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶18, 104 P.3d 1265, to show that because CI admitted to 
committing a crime, that admission created “probable cause to search.” State’s 
Brief at 17 (relying upon United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). But the problem with that position is that the admission here, 
that CI purchased marijuana from “Mike” at some unknown time, is far different 
than the admissions which created probable cause in Harris. There the Court 
conceded that “admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to 
contemporaneous or later accusations of another.” Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584. In 
fact, it was only because the informant’s admissions there was of an ongoing and 
long term illegal activity, “that over a long period and currently he had been 
buying illicit liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that 
property and furnished probable cause.” Id. CI’s admission, to having bought 
marijuana an undisclosed number of times and no description of when, does not 
rise to the level of reliability mentioned in Harris. 
 The State argues that the arranged drug purchase corroborated CI’s claims 
and dismisses the trial court’s concerns about “control” because “an affidavit is 
judged on the adequacy of what it does contain” not what a “critic might say 
should have been added.” State’s Brief at 19 (quoting United States v. Kinson, 710 
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F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013)). The State thinks the trial court’s criticism of the 
“controlled” buy has to do with what affidavit does not contain, it thinks the court 
had doubts about probable cause because it wanted the officers to have done 
something other than what they did. That isn’t it. The Court had doubts about 
probable cause because of what the officers did do. The officers saw CI drive up in 
his car without any idea what was in his car. The officers allowed CI get back into 
his car, still having no idea what was in his car. The officers allowed CI to spend 
time in the car, alone. This is not a matter of the trial court imagining the perfect 
scenario, it is recognizing how the facts recited by the officers failed to show there 
was good reason to believe what CI said happened was the truth. 
 When all these factors are considered, CI’s lack of credibility, the officer’s 
failure to corroborate any of his claims, and the complete lack of control over the 
buy, the trial court’s conclusion that the affidavit did not establish probable cause 
is correct. Compare State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993). This Court 
should affirm the trial court’s decision. 
2. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis to conclude the 
affidavit established probable cause? 
 As argued above, Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard 
of review is unconstitutional because it reduces the level of evidence needed to 
support a warrant, and that this Court should apply a correctness review on the 
question of whether or not the affidavit established probable cause. However, if 
the Court is content to apply the federal standard of review, Defendants maintain, 
for all the reasons explained above, that the magistrate would not have had a 
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substantial basis to conclude there was probable cause evidence of a crime would 
be found in the house. 
 To the extent that “a substantial basis” for probable cause is a lower 
standard than probable cause there are federal cases applying this standard 
which demonstrate the lack of substantial basis. For example, in addition to the 
concerns argued above, the magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to 
concluded probable cause existed because the affidavit contained significant 
errors that called into question the officer’s own credibility. For example, the 
officer acknowledges he has only recently met CI “in the past 72 hours”. R.062. In 
the next paragraph he claims “[t]he CI has provided creditable [sic] information 
and has not said anything that would prove false or misleading. The information 
the CI has given has been investigated and proved credible.” R.062.  
 One might ask, what information has been investigated and proved 
credible? Obviously it was not the fact that “Mike” lived at the address, because 
officers had “attempted through every avenue to try and identify Mike”, including 
“[r]ecords checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting 
information from other agencies”, all of which failed to corroborate CI’s claims. 
R.063. It was not the information CI provided about prior drug buys from 
“Mike”, nor was it the fact that “Mike” packages his products in vacuum sealed 
bags. In fact the only fact that CI provided to the officers that was verified in any 
way was the claim that, on the day of the buy, CI bought marijuana from this 
unknown person at the house and then CI presented marijuana to the officers. 
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But that corroboration was significantly undermined by the lack of control. 
Obviously the drugs could have come from CI, the person “familiar with drug 
distribution and drug practices” who was currently seeking “leniency for pending 
charges”. R.062. 
 The magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to believe anything at 
all would be found at that house, that “Mike” was a real person, or that anyone, 
other than CI, had access to marijuana.  
II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EXCLUSION OF 
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE  
A. Larocco, Sims, Thompson, Debooy 
 The State acknowledges Larocco, Thompson, Sims, and Debooy as cases in 
which this Court has recognized the independent exclusionary rule for violations 
of article I, section 14. State’s Brief at 22-24. And whatever criticism may be made 
about the underlying reasoning of any or all of those cases, the fact of the matter 
cannot be doubted, the current state of the law in Utah is that “exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of 
article I, section 14.” State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (quoting State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)). As it stands, the trial court was correct 
when it concluded it did not have “authority to depart from binding precedent.” 
R.185. Defendants assert that this precedent is still binding, on every court in this 
state, unless and until this Court reverses these former decisions. 
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B. This Court should not overturn its precedent 
1. Stare decisis 
 “Stare decisis ‘is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence’ because it 
‘is crucial to the predictability of the law and fairness of adjudication.’” Eldridge, 
2015 UT 21, ¶21 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). 
Thus, this Court will not overturn its precedents “lightly”, instead it will only do 
so if the precedent is not considered “weighty” because it was not (1) based on 
persuasive authority and reasoning, and is not (2) firmly established in the law 
since it was handed down. Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶22. The Defendants now assert 
that this Court should not overrule the above cited precedent establishing a state 
exclusionary rule arising from article I, section 14. Defendants assert the Utah 
exclusionary rule was based upon sound authority and reasoning and is firmly 
established in Utah’s constitutional case law. 
 There can be little doubt that this Court’s decision, recognizing the state 
exclusionary rule, in Larocco, and repeated in Sims and Thompson, has been the 
subject of debate and criticism.9 But that criticism has not resulted in overturning 
the precedent. Utah constitutional law, as it currently stands, provides that 
“[e]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I, section 14.” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472 (and repeated 
verbatim by four justices in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419). 
 Because of that status, in order to overturn these cases and reverse course 
                                                
9 See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶¶27-58 (J. Lee, concurring). 
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away from the constitutional requirement of exclusion, this Court must not only 
find that the prior precedent is lightweight enough to be overturned, but it must 
also find that it should be overturned, that some alternative to exclusion is a more 
sound and constitutionally viable path. Defendants assert that the 
Larocco/Thompson precedent is weighty enough to withstand scrutiny, and if 
not, given the opportunity to determine the scope of our constitutional 
protection, this Court should still reach the same result. As the trial court put it, 
“[e]ven if it could disregard precedent and strike out on its own, this Court 
[should] for the reasons stated below leave the exclusionary rule firmly 
ensconced in state search and seizure jurisprudence.” R.185-86. 
 The State claims the Thompson decision is “not the most weighty of 
precedents” because it “did not [analyze(?)] the text or history of Article I, § 14, 
and failed to acknowledge, much less explain why it was departing from, this 
Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a state exclusionary rule for violations 
of Article I, § 14.” State’s Brief at 23. Defendants’ reading of Thompson is 
different. Thompson relied upon the reasoning of Larocco to recognize the 
exclusionary rule of section 14, it relied upon Larocco’s explanation. See 
Thompson, 419. And Larocco certainly did examine the text of section 14, 
considered how the two clauses related to each other and how different courts at 
different times have applied different approaches. Larocco, 467. 
 The State’s position about Thompson begs the question, did “this Court’s 
long-standing precedent rejecting a state exclusionary rule” analyze the text or 
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history of Article I? This long-standing precedent, State v. Aime, when it rejected 
the idea of exclusion, did it consider the 24 years of precedent the text of section 
14 had established? To criticize Thompson and ignore the failures of Aime 
demonstrates the real crux of the problem with Utah constitutional law in 
general. This Court’s decision have not always met the high standard its recent 
case law has established. Defendants encourage the Court to take this 
opportunity, to leave no stone unturned and issue a decision that will clarify the 
meaning of section 14. 
2. The text of the Utah Constitution supports exclusion 
 If the Court is inclined to find that the precedent of Larocco, Sims, 
Thompson, and Debooy should not be followed as a matter of stare decisis, and 
that the doctrine of an independent state exclusionary rule should be 
reconsidered, Defendants believe that this Court’s analysis of section 14 will 
reestablish exclusion as the proper remedy for violations of Utah’s search and 
seizure protections. 
 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14 (emphasis added). There are two main 
sections, the security section, and the warrant section. Neither of those sections 
explicitly require the Court to exclude evidence obtained from a violation of the 
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rights. However, Defendants contend that the meaning of the text, the meaning 
of the rights, implies exclusion as fundamental to the right. 
 The plain text requires that no warrant shall issue without probable cause. 
But what if a warrant does issue without probable cause? It happens, it happened 
in this case. Then what? The State argues that the text of section 14 “does not 
impose or otherwise contemplate an exclusionary remedy.” According to the 
State, because the text does not explicitly create a rule of evidence making 
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, there is not textual support for 
exclusion. State’s Brief at 33-34 (citing Aime, 220 P. at 707). Defendants contend 
that exclusion is not the equivalent of a rule of evidence.  
 Exclusion is not about admissibility; it is not as though illegally obtained 
evidence is being excluded because the Court has misgivings about the evidence’s 
reliability, as if it were a concern about foundation or authentication. 
Admissibility and the rules of evidence have as their aim the admission of reliable 
and competent evidence so as to get as near to the truth as possible. Illegally 
obtained evidence may be very reliable. In many cases it will be the most reliable 
source of evidence about what the defendant is accused of doing. That has no 
bearing on the question of whether it should be included at trial. Exclusion is not 
about the truth. Reliable or not, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is about 
the fundamental and inalienable rights of the people, and about the fundamental 
and invaluable limits on the powers of the government. Exclusion does not make 
evidence merely inadmissible, it makes it utterly unavailable to the state. 
 33 
Exclusion should forbid the government the power to use the fruits of it crimes in 
any way. Exclusion is about undoing the government’s wrongs and re-securing an 
individual’s person and property. 
 Presumably, according to the State’s logic, because section 14 does not 
impose or otherwise contemplate any explicit remedy, the rights in section 14 are 
merely rights that have no efficacy. State’s Brief at 33. But complaining about the 
lack of an explicit remedy creates a problem that need not exist. Defendants 
implore the Court to reject this logic as destructive to the fundamental rights we, 
as a constitutionally based society, hold most sacred. Instead, Defendants 
propose the alternative logic of ‘where there is a right, there is a remedy.’10 
Security in one’s home and person and property is its own remedy, the right is 
the remedy. Exclusion is the right, because it is the vindication of the right. 
Exclusion is the manifestation of the right after the government has broken the 
law.  
 After all, the fact that the government violated Defendants’ right does not 
extinguish the rights in section 14. Michael Rowan and Rebecca George are still 
entitled to these rights, even today, even years after the government violated their 
rights. At this very moment Defendants maintain the right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches of their home, past present, and future. That includes the 
                                                
10 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws, whenever he receives an injury… Blackstone states [that]… ‘it is a 
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’”). 
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right in the future to be secure from the consequences of the government’s illegal 
conduct. At this moment Defendants maintain the right to demand that judicial 
officers not issue warrants to search their home without probable cause, and to 
be free from the consequences of prior illegitimate warrants. Security from these 
violations means the government cannot continue to violate one’s rights long 
after the police drive away from the house. 
 Exclusion puts the Defendants, whose privacy has been violated, back into 
the legal standing they enjoyed before the government destroyed the sanctity of 
their home. Exclusion vindicates the ongoing right to privacy, to security in the 
home, to security in the privacy of the contents and activities in the home. And 
while it may not perfectly accomplish the goal of restoring a person to his pre-
violation status, while his door may still be smashed-in and his property flung 
from drawers, exclusion does restore the circumstances by removing the evidence 
collected from the violation from the government’s use, exactly where it would 
have been if the violation had not occurred. Without exclusion, Defendants’ the 
right to security in their home is repeated over and over as the details of their 
private lives are exposed, to attorneys and clerks, to jurors and journalists, and to 
the public at large. Exclusion stops the government’s ongoing violation; without it 
the defendant’s rights are repeatedly violated. 
 The Utah framers would have understood that including the right to be 
secure from unreasonable searches was an actual right, not merely an empty 
aspirational goal for the government to do its best to comply with except when it 
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didn’t suit their other purposes. The Utah framers would have understood that 
security in one’s home and personal effects was an ongoing right and did not end 
when after a violation. And in order to give meaning to that right, the framers 
would have understood there must be a way to protect and enforce that right, into 
the future, especially for those whose rights had been violated.11 The framers, in 
light of Boyd (see infra), would have imbued the language of section 14 with an 
understanding that security in one’s home includes preventing the government 
from using illegally obtained evidence at a trial and continuing the ongoing 
intrusion. The framers would have understood that exclusion is part of the right 
of the people to be secure from government crimes. 
3. The historical context supports exclusion  
 The Utah Constitution of 1895 was the last in a long line of attempts by the 
Territory of Utah/Deseret to become a state. Beginning as early as 184912 the 
settlers assembled in constitutional conventions and repeatedly attempted to 
establish a constitution. While those efforts resulted in numerous iterations of a 
proposed constitution, none of these constitutions were accepted by the United 
States until after the Enabling Act passed in 1894. The 1895 version of the Utah 
Constitution, including the Declaration of Rights of article I, had been evolving 
throughout these forty-five years, usually borrowing portions from other state 
                                                
11 See Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2010) 
("Remedies give meaning to obligations imposed by the rest of the substantive 
law."). 
12 See Dale Morgan, State of Deseret, Utah Historical Quarterly, 8 (1940), page 
85. 
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constitutions.13 “The development of Utah constitutional thought thus shows 
familiarity with constitutional development on other states, and demonstrates 
that Utah, despite her experiments in marriage and economic relationships, was 
not ready to depart from the traditional forms of American government”, 
including judicial review of constitutional protections. HICKMAN, at 74. This 
familiarity would have included judicial review of constitutional protections and 
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions. 
 Right in the middle of that constitutional evolution, in 1886, the United 
States Supreme Court considered the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), where the defendant claimed his Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated by an 1874 law requiring him to produce his 
private books and papers in a case against him. He objected to the government 
requiring him to provide this evidence but his argument failed and he lost at trial. 
In its opinion the Court recalled the “recent history of the controversies on the 
subject, both in this country and in England” related to the issuance of writs of 
assistance allowing the authorities to search for evidence of smuggled goods. 
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25. The Court concluded that application of the law 
constituted an illegal search or seizure and that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
prevented the federal government from forcing a person to produce evidence in 
this manner. Most importantly for the purposes of this case, the Court ordered 
                                                
13 See MARTIN HICKMAN, Utah Constitutional Law, 40-78 (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation available at the University of Utah J. Williard Marriott Library and 
the Brigham Young University Harold B. Lee Library). 
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that the “judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the cause 
remanded, with directions to award a new trial.” Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638. That 
new trial would have to proceed without the use of the illegally seized evidence 
because “its admission in evidence by the court, [was] erroneous and 
unconstitutional proceedings.” Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638. In other words, the 
United States Supreme Court, in 1886 ruled that evidence that violated the 
Fourth Amendment must be excluded. 
 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1996) wrote a thoughtful statement about how the framers of the 
Utah Constitution must have felt about the rights they were enshrining in article 
I. Because the federal Bill of Rights was not incorporated into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until much later, “the framers of the Utah 
Constitution… viewed their own state constitutional provisions as the sole source 
of constitutional protection for those individual liberties enshrined” in our state 
declaration of rights. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (J. Stewart, concurring in the 
result). Those framers would not have had any reason to expect that the citizens 
of Utah would be protected from state actors by the Fourth Amendment. Because 
of that lack of protection, these constitutional authors wanted to protect the 
citizens of Utah from the same kinds of state government overreach that the 
Fourth Amendment provided from the federal government. If the framers of the 
Utah Constitution only wanted the citizens of Utah to be protected from the 
federal government and not from the action of state authorities, there would have 
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been no need to enact article I, section 14. But they enacted section 14 with an 
obvious desire to protect the people of Utah from the actions of the state 
government.  
 This desire would have been made in light of the holding in Boyd, and the 
exclusionary function of the language of the Fourth Amendment. It would have 
been made in light of the United State Supreme Court’s rejection of the earlier 
longstanding proposition that illegally seized evidence could still be admitted. 
Instead, understanding that the Fourth Amendment protected Mr. Boyd from the 
use of illegally obtained evidence by US Marshalls at his trial, the Utah framers 
used nearly identical language to protect Utahans from state actors using illegally 
obtained evidence in state cases. In 1895, when the framers of Utah’s constitution 
were basing section 14 upon the text and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
exclusion was part of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The State points to Justice Lee’s concurring opinion in Walker, 2011 UT 
53, ¶49, where he points out that “no appellate court in any state had excluded 
unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution” in 1895. State’s Brief at 37, 
fn.4. Presumably this suggests that other states did not believe their constitutions 
required exclusion, and therefore neither would have Utah framers. But this fact 
means very little because Boyd, and its recognition of exclusionary as a 
constitutionally mandated remedy, had only happened in 1886, long after most 
states had adopted their constitutions with a pre-Boyd understanding of search 
and seizure. The framers of those earlier state constitutions would arguably not 
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have understood their own constitutions, though similar to the federal 
constitution, to require exclusion because at the time they were ratified exclusion 
was not yet recognized. But in 1895, after Boyd, state constitutional framers, like 
those in Utah, who looked to the language of the Fourth Amendment would have 
understood that exclusion was part and parcel of the right against illegal search 
and seizure. 
 Defendants dispute the State’s position that exclusion as a constitutional 
requirement would have been foreign to the drafters of the Utah Constitution. 
Based on the historical setting and the state of the Fourth Amendment after 
1889, exclusion was the part of search and seizure. These drafters were well 
aware of the Fourth Amendment, and would have been aware of the United 
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of it at that time. They would have 
understood that, according to Boyd, if evidence had been illegally obtained any 
judgment based on that evidence was illegitimate and should result in reversal 
and a new trial without the illegal evidence. The framers would have understood 
the that the language they enacted would have had the same meaning. 
 Defendants assert that this Court should not overturn the precedent of 
Larocco and Thompson. The Court should reaffirm the authority of the Utah 
Constitution to protect our citizens from the unreasonable and unwarranted 
intrusions of an at times overzealous government, independent of the 
inconsistent and unpredictable federal exclusionary rule. This Court should take 
an active role in supporting, obeying, and defending the rights of Utahans as it 
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interprets the limits meaning of our own founding document. Defendants asks 
the Court to contemplate what security from unreasonable search and seizure 
means it if a violation has no consequence. Defendants ask the Court to consider 
whether the use of illegally obtained evidence would not be itself another 
violation of the right to be secure in one’s home, papers, and effects. Does one 
lose the right of security in these places and property for ever after once the 
government commits the initial violation? Defendants ask the Court to defend 
our right to be secure from government intrusion, even after the intrusion occurs. 
Defendants suggest that exclusion of evidence is not a mere remedy tacked on the 
back end to try to deter future violations. Exclusion is a continuation of the right, 
it is security from unlawful state action even after a violation. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION TO UTAH’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
A. Prior Utah precedent implicitly shows there is no good-faith 
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule 
 While this Court has previously stated that it has yet to decide whether or 
not the state exclusionary rule is subject to a good-faith exception. “We leave for 
another day the issue of whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution.” Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420. However, without explicitly 
denying that a good-faith exception exists, the Court did not recognize one in a 
situation where it likely would have applied. 
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 In State v. Debooy, 2000 UT 546, ¶1, the defendant was convicted of drug 
possession charges and appealed his case challenging the constitutionality of a 
checkpoint where the police discovered evidence of crimes. The police filed an 
application with a magistrate requesting authorization to conduct an 
“administrative highway checkpoint” with the intent to inspect or detect traffic 
and safety related violations, and “[o]ther alcohol and/or controlled substance 
violations.” Debooy, ¶2. The magistrate authorized the checkpoint and the 
defendant was investigated when he was stopped. Id, ¶¶3-4. While stopped at the 
checkpoint the officers asked consent to search, received it, and discovered 
“contraband in a backpack in the trunk.” Id., ¶4. 
 On appeal this Court found that the section 14 and the Fourth Amendment 
have not “always been interpreted the same way” and that this Court “will not 
hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will 
more appropriately protect the rights of this state’s citizens.” Id., ¶12. The Court 
considered federal cases examining checkpoints but “solely for their persuasive 
value, and [did] not regard them as binding for purposes of state law.” Id, ¶19. 
The Court recognized the interest section 14 has in protecting against practices 
similar to general warrants where officers were given authority to search without 
specified probable cause. Id., at ¶26. 
 Eventually the Court concluded that the police checkpoint violated section 
14 prohibition that against unreasonable searches and seizures in section 14. Id., 
¶33. Implicitly, the court found that the police action was not protected by their 
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good-faith reliance upon the magistrate’s authorization. Presumably, if a good-
faith exception were to exist under Utah’s Constitution, Debooy would have been 
an opportunity to recognize it.  
 Defendant’s assert that the erroneous judicial authorization of an 
administrative checkpoint that is later executed by the police is analogous to the 
issuance of a warrant that lacks probable cause that is later executed in good-
faith by the police. In both instances the constitutional error is caused by the 
magistrate authorizing the police action. In both instances the police have done 
nothing wrong. In both instances the defendant’s right to be secure from an 
unreasonable search or seizure and a warrant without probable cause is violated.  
Because this Court did not recognize a good-faith exception to section 14 in 
Debooy, it should not recognize one here. 
B. A good-faith exception is inconsistent with the text of Utah’s 
Constitution 
 The text of section 14 requires that no warrant shall issue except upon 
probable cause. If the Court were to adopt a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule it would allow the government use warrants issued without 
probable cause. A good-faith exception would lower the explicit constitutional 
requirement of probable cause with some lower standard. What could be more 
offensive to the explicit probable cause standard than to judicially acknowledge 
the validity of warrants executed without probable cause? This perversion of one 
of the most basic tenants of constitutional law should not be adopted. 
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C. A good-faith exception is inconsistent with the purposes of 
the exclusionary rule 
 The State would have the Court adopt the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, (1974) 
and find that the only purpose of an exclusionary rule is to deter future 
constitutional violations by law enforcement. But such a conclusion would be to 
neuter the constitution and ignore the historical meaning of exclusion. 
 “[T]he Leon holding could not have been reached but for the [U.S.] 
Supreme Court’s narrow justification for the exclusionary rule”, that was 
accomplished by rewriting history and limiting the purpose of the rule to only 
deterring future unlawful police conduct. State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 
(Idaho 1992) (referring to Calandra). In fact, the United States Supreme Court 
stated in many cases that the purposes of the exclusionary rule are to protect a 
person's Fourth Amendment guarantees by deterring lawless conduct by police 
officers and to close the courthouse doors "to any use of evidence 
unconstitutionally obtained." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).14 Rowan now asserts, and many jurisdictions 
have agreed, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “revisionist history of the 
                                                
14 See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 
(1975) (the dual considerations of deterrence and judicial integrity are 
commonplace purposes of the exclusionary rule); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (The exclusionary rule serves to deter 
police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity, to prevent the courts from 
being “made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by 
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions”); Elkins 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (The 
exclusionary rule also serves “the imperative of judicial integrity.”). 
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exclusionary rule” is inaccurate, untrue to the spirit and previously stated 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671. A similar 
limited view of article I, section 14, and should not be adopted in Utah. Rather, 
unlike the current majority vision of the federal exclusionary rule, Utah’s 
exclusionary rule has multiple purposes and justifications beyond deterrence of 
future police conduct and creating a good faith exception would defeat those 
other purposes and justifications. 
 The exclusionary rule is a vindication of constitutional rights. As explained 
in Weeks, the prosecution’s use of illegally seized evidence involved “a denial of 
the constitutional rights of the accused.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). That would have been the same purpose 
for exclusion in Boyd, the case upon which the drafters of section 14 would have 
based our exclusionary rule.  
 That same purpose was recognized in New Jersey when its supreme court 
rejected the Leon exception too. The exclusionary “rule also serves as the 
indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches.” State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987). In 
New Mexico the supreme court’s finding of an independent exclusionary rule did 
not focus “on deterrence or judicial integrity, nor do we propose a judicial 
remedy; instead, our focus is to effectuate in the pending case the constitutional 
right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. 
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993).  
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 With these additional purposes of the exclusionary rule firmly established 
in Utah law, based both in history and logic, there is no sense in creating a good-
faith exception. The State’s attempt to do so cannot be said to come from any 
reverence to the constitution, but instead from a desire to minimize and dilute 
the rights of the people and to enlarge power of the government. Given this 
Court’s unique responsibility to the Utah Constitution, this Court should view 
such request very skeptically. 
 Defendants support and reiterate the arguments against a good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule made by the trial court in this case. See R.188-
194. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
 Because the trial court correctly concluded the affidavit failed to support 
probable cause, and because the magistrate did not have a substantial basis to 
find probable cause, this court should affirm the granting of Defendant’s motion 
to dismiss. This Court should not reverse its cases recognizing the state 
exclusionary rule or create a good-faith exception thereto. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of September, 2016. 
 
       ________________________ 
       Douglas Thompson 
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